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In the Preface to Philosophical Investigations, a 
dissatisfied Wittgenstein reflects back upon his text 
as "a number of sketches of landscapes," or unfinished 
remarks about many philosophical subjects.1 Wittgen-
stein uses the album metaphor to suggest that the sket-
ches are fitted together as a composite view of 
language: "The same or almost the same points are al-
ways being approached afresh from different directions, 
and new sketches made. Very many of these were badly 
drawn or uncharacteristic, marked by all the defects of 
a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected a num-
ber of tolerable ones were left, which now had to be 
arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you looked 
at them you could get t» picture of the landscape. Thus 
this book is really only an ablura" (p. v). Yet though 
the preface records a dissapointment with the text to 
follow, the failure is taken to be one of skill, the 
defect of the draughtsman, and not of the project 
itself. 
The sketches try to depict an alledgedly serious 
disorder found in philosophical discourse. It is the 
philosopher's task to treat this disorder: "The 
philosopher's treatment of a question is like the 
treatment of an illness" (sec. 255). One symptom of 
this illness is displaced expressions: "When philo-
sophers use a word . . . one must always ask oneself: 
is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language-game which is its orignial home" (sec. 116). 
Wittgenstein's attempts to remind us of the proper con-
text for our words are, however, more than therapeutic 
technique since in order to locate the cause of bad 
philosophy in an incorrect view of language, he also 
sketches a correct view of language.2 
The Investigations begins its therapy on a passage 
by St. Augustine. The preface, however, has us begin 
the book earlier, with the illusions of the Tractatus: 
the Investigations can "be seen in the right light only 
by contrast with and against the background of my old 
way of thinking" (p. vi). Let us recall then, some im-
portant statements from the Tractatus' picture theory 
of meaning: "A proposition is a picture of reality."1 
"One name stands for one thing, another for another 
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thing, and they are combined with one another. In this 
way the whole group—like a tableau vivant—projects a 
state of affairs" (4.0311). The Investigations is a 
critique of this "bad picture" of meaning, that is, of 
a view that incorporates the notion of picture to 
secure propositional meaning. 
It is curious that the preface shows no hestitancy 
in invoking "pictures" to describe the form of a book 
which was "pictured differently at different times" (p. 
4).* There is a difference between the picture-
proposition of the Tractatus and the description of 
language "pictured" in the Investigations. We need to 
decide if the view of meaning implied in the latter 
work escapes the critique developed against the former. 
The Tractatus and the passage removed from the 
Confessions depict the same "bad picture" of language. 
Wittgenstein writes that St. Augustine's "words 
. . . give us a particular picture of the essence of 
human language. It is this: the individual words in a 
language name objects—sentences are combinations of 
such names" (sec. 1). Philosophers behave like 
"savages, primitive people," because they have a primi-
tive conception of how language works, or as 
Wittgenstein insinuates, a conception of a "primitive 
language-game" (sec. 194). Wittgenstein imagines a 
language-game in order to instruct us on how language 
really works. The particular game serve especially 
well because it plays at filling in the bad picture of 
St. Augustine. The game consists of four words: 
'block', 'slab', 'pillar', and 'beam' (sec. 2). 
Because the words all function in the same way, seem-
ingly as names, and because they name building materi-
als out of which complex constructions are made, the 
game seems to picture the Tractatus-view that language 
is composed of simple names. The four words are called 
out by a builder in the order in which the assistant is 
to bring their objects. Since each word allegedly acts 
as a name, the relation between the names is shown in 
the order of their use. 
Although we can characterize a Tractatus-theory of 
names and realations in terms of a simplified activity 
of building, the theory is incomplete. The Tractatus 
misses the significance of the game of building, the 
bigger picture or backgroud, surrounding and giving 
sense to the words and relations contained within the 
game. The calling out of 'slab'--which serves as a 
command as well as a name—would make no sense outside 
of its game. Likewise explanations of meaning which 
refer to objects succeed only if the over-all role of 
the word in the game is known. This is the point of 
the remark: "When one shews someone the king in chess 
and says: 'This is the king', this does not tell him 
the use of this piece . . . unless he is already master 
of a game" (sec. 31). Knowing the object to which a 
word refers does not by itself constitute knowing the 
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grammar of the word. The picture theory neglects pre-
cisely this: meaning is determined by (though not 
identical with) circumstances of "use" (sec. 43). 
Wittgenstein's description of "circumstances of 
use" as a "complicated network of similarities, over-
lapping, and criss-crossing" (sec. 66) reminds us of 
his characterization of the text itself: "the very 
nature of the investigation . . . compels us to travel 
over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every 
direction" (p. v). The fiber metaphor depicts the 
unity resulting from the network of similarities: "In 
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the 
strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that 
some fibre runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of the fibres" (sec. 67). Again the inter-
weaving of the Investigations' topics serves to an 
illustration. 
Wittgenstein further illustrates the notion of cir-
cumstances of use with the metaphor of family resem-
blance: "I can think of no better expression to 
characterize these similarities than 'family resem-
blance'; for the various resemblances between members 
of a family . . . overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way" (sec. 67). It is because philosophers forget 
that words have a family of uses that they think that 
each word has one mysteriously attached meaning (sec. 
116), that that meaning can be pindowned, and that 
meaning can be determinate and unambiguous. 
In order for an album-theory of meaning to replace 
a picture-theory of meaning and preserve the possibil-
ity of determinate meaning, it mast be possible to 
locate the proper circumstances for interpretting a 
picture, or a linguistic expression in general. 
Otherwise, one is free to imagine alternative meanings 
(p. 54 (a)). Wittgenstein offers an example of how we 
might give sense to a picture by way of a further 
picture: "I see a picture which represents a smiling 
fact. What do I do if I take the smile now as a kind 
one, now as malicious: Don't I often imagine it with a 
context which is one either of kindness or malice? 
Thus I might supply the picture with the fancy 
(Vorstellen) that the smiler was smiling down on a 
child at play, or again on the suffering of an enemy" 
(sec. 539). The sense of any one of the "sketches" of 
the "Investigations is already provided by the sur-
rounding sketches. Recalling the metaphor of the pre-
face, the picture of the landscape framed by the covers 
of the book (extended to include Tractatus) determines 
the significane of the sketches contained within. 
While the preface confesses that the Investigations 
falls short of its own rigorous demand for a finished 
picture of its subject—the defect is taken to be that 
of the draughtsman--the desire for complete depiction, 
or determinate meaning, persists. According to the 
Investigations proper, that clarity can be achieved, 
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for example, by studying primitive language-games as 
simple models of linguistic use: "It disperses the fog 
to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds 
of application in which one can command a clear view of 
the aim and functions of the words" (sec. 5). Without 
the possibility of a definite boundary for context, the 
fog which surrounds language could not be so forcefully 
and finally dispersed. Wittgenstein could not announce 
that "the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed com-
plete clarity . . . (meaning] that the philosophical 
problems should completely disappear" (sec. 33). 
Wittgenstein's hope for complete clarity could not 
have been fulfilled, not even in the simple model of a 
primitive language-game. The process of deferring 
meaning from an isolated word or picture to its func-
tion in the larger story or album is an endless one. 
Section 359 (quoted in part above) goes on to say "I 
can also take the at first sight gracious situation 
[e.g., a kind smile] and interpret it differently 
[e.g., as malicious] by putting it into a wider 
context. — I f no special circumstances reverse my in-
terpretation I shall conceive a particular smile as 
kind, call it a 'kind' one, react correspondingly. 
((Probability, frequency))" (sec. 539, italics mine). 
The addition of the second paragraph, however, suggests 
a more difficult problem than that of wider contexts. 
The revised paragraph, places the "special" case--we 
think of the less probably, malicious smile—in a 
"wider context" than the kind smile. The first para-
graph, however, claims that the contexts differentia-
ting the kind smile and the less probably malicious 
smile are distinct, but parallel. The fact that 
Wittgenstein preserves his first analysis of context 
along with the second and competing version opens the 
question of whether re-interpretation can be securred 
by a fuller understanding of a unified context. Witt-
genstein offers no guarantee that the contexts sur-
rounding a linguistic event are not distinct, competing 
and finally irresolvable. 
The section ends with the hint, "((Probability, 
frequency))," guarantined in double parentheses. The 
hint serves to remind us that we ordinarily interpret 
isolated linguistic expressions according to their 
likely context. The queer parentheses, tv/ice removing 
the hint from the body of the text, quietly signal 
something suspicious in the need for the enclosed 
terms. For one thing, they are terms whose home is the 
empirical sciences, a place which is off-limits for a 
study which claims to be purely descriptive and un-
hypothetical (sec. 109). 
Secondly, there is a problem covered over by 
Wittgenstein's intoduction of the notions of probabil-
ity and frequency into his discussion of interpreta-
tion. Interpretations are not simply more or less 
likely, but are based upon context. Likelihood is it-
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self determined in relation to context. Since every 
meaning of a linguistic expression, however, depends 
upon some context, this context, as another expression, 
is subject to more extensive and even conflicting 
parallel contexts. For example, the Investigations 
requires another text, the Tractatus, in order to be 
correctly interpreted, but this supplement is not suf-
ficient either. Some of the discussion has its motive 
in problems raised by Frege or Russell. How do we 
decide whom Wittgenstein is addressing? Can we include 
Schopenhauer whose influence is perhaps limited to 
style? Can we include Kant since Wittgenstein seems to 
borrow distinctions from him—even if he claims never 
to have read any text of Kant's? The deferral of mean-
ing from context to context is never completed.' 
The view of meaning which depends on the signifi-
cance of context renders all determination of meaning 
indeterminate. Hope for a most comprehensive context 
which could perfectly constitute the scene for all the 
games played within may rest upon the notion of a form 
of life. And yet this notion, too, is only a move in a 
game, for example, the one dis-played in the Investiga-
tions. Any global concept achieves its use in a local 
game. The idealistic endeavor to construct a general 
category as the final boundary for meaning must forget 
that this concept can be played out in an indefinite 
number of ways. It is possible for Wittgenstein to 
have arranged and sometimes cut down his sketches for 
the Investigations because we can re-arrange and re-
divide the linguistic facts contained within any boun-
dary in an indefinite number of ways. This is not to 
say that meaning is impossible but that it works 
through contexts playing against other contexts, con-
tending for a determining role in a linguistic game. 
One might think that the imagining of larger or con-
flicting contexts misses the point that there are ac-
tual cases in which we say that now these words mean 
this.6 "Getting the picture" in a particular instance, 
however, requires making a decision about boundaries, 
and thus about what counts as "imagining" a wider 
or difficult context. This decision, like the sketches 
of the Investigations, is always subject to revision. 
There is no finally frameable picture of the landscape, 
or one which doesn't lack a part of the outside scene 
which can always enter into the picture. No text is 
complete by itself, no matter how comprehensive it is. 
Every picture calls for another one in order to settle 
its meaning. No meaning is finally settled.7 
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NOTES 
'Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
trans., G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 1968), preface, p. v. All further 
references to this work appear in the text. References 
to the German are from the following edition: Philoso-
phische Untersuchungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkainp, 
1977). 
3Terry Eagleton in his article "Wittenstein's 
Friends" (New Left Review, no 135, Sept.-Oct., 1982, p. 
72) alludes to a possible deconstruction of Wittgen-
stein' s Philosophical Investigations by exploiting 
Jacques Derrida' s T a pharraacie de Platon," in La 
dessemination, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972). The 
argument works by suggesting that since ordinary lan-
guage is corruptible by bad philosophy, ordinary lan-
guage must be always already philosophical. Eagleton 
criticizes Derrida for having a kind of negative 
metaphysics: all philosophical theses are left 
standing—even as their support is kicked, out from 
underneath. Eagleton writes: "Those post-structura-
lists who believe that in subverting the concepts of 
certainty they are putting the skids under metaphysics 
should perhaps consider that in this respect at least 
they are doing exactly the opposite" (p. 70). It would 
seem that the deconstructionists' only gain is the 
amendment to metaphysics that nothing is certain. 
My paper attempts a deconstruction of the Investi-
gations, but uses a different strategy than that recom-
mended by Eagleton, since the latter examines the pro-
blem of indeterminate contexts. The sketches of the 
Investigations can never be finished, and this lack has 
philosophical and not just practical consequences. 
Deconstruction doesn't merely tack onto the Investiga-
tions' claim "probably, but uncertain." Wittgenstein, 
similarly, cannot simply add onto section 539 of his 
text the comment "((Probability, frequency))," and 
proceed as though the parenthetical clause were margi-
nal and innocuous. As a supplement--I follow Derrida--
the amendment disrupts the project itself. 
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophi-
cus (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 4.021. 
Further references to this work appear in the text. 
*P. M. S. Hacker discusses the significance of what 
he translates as the "surview" for the Investigations 
in Insight and Illusion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), p. 10 and pp. 113-14. 
'The Investigations' ironic and aphoristic style 
and the use of 11 sketches" and metaphors appear out ot 
place with the call for complete clarity as a philo-
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sophical ideal. The excesses of the style illustrate 
the problem of indeterminate context and the possibil-
ity for reinterpretation which work against all texts. 
'Jack Canfield formulated these objections. 
'The problem of incomplete determination is com-
pounded by the consideration that the weave of the 
language-game—I extend Wittgenstein's metaphor—works 
not only in the horizontal or contextual, dimension of 
the fiber (sec. 67), but also in the vertical dimension 
of metaphorical displacement, or substitution. Meaning 
is determined not only by what appears as part of the 
context, but also by what does not in fact accompany 
the text and yet is also relevant to its meaning. 
Displacements of ordinary language are patterns for 
philosophical displacement. The vertical dimension 
hides in the ironic and metaphoric style of the 
Investigations. Wittgenstein forgets the vertical 
dimension of his text, he overlooks the significance of 
his use of a metaphor, even as he locates meaning in 
"language-games." (I thank Jack Canfield, Lewis 
Mackey, John Willett-Shoptaw, and especially Edwin 
Allaire for their generous and penetrating criticisms 
of my paper.) 
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